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Summary: In this paper, Antoine Brunet questions the OECD method in calculating 
contributions to GDP growth. He tries to show this method induces the users to seriously 
misjudge the contribution of external trade balance to GDP growth.  He shows there is 
an alternative method, i.e. the AB method which is mathematically as correct as the 
OECD one. And this method is much more pertinent and allows the users to distinguish 
between two kinds of countries: on the one hand, the mercantilist countries and on the 
other hand, the non-mercantilist countries.  
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Introduction: The OECD method is too simplistic 
 
While no one today will deny that demand fuels production, at least in the short 
term, it is important to differentiate between the two principal categories of de-
mand that are beneficial to a country: domestic demand and net foreign demand. 
In many debates, and particularly in a period of global crisis, it is deci-
sive to know, country by country, the relative contribution of domestic demand 
to GDP growth and that of net foreign demand.  
Sixty years ago, in 1949, during the period of reconstruction, the econ-
omists at the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment) hastily invented a rather simplistic method to establish these contributions. 
Sixty years later, this method remains widely used, and until now has not raised 
any real objections. 
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Over the years, this method has gained quasi-official status:  the two ma-
jor international financial press agencies, Reuters and Bloomberg, have used it 
systematically whenever commenting on the latest quarterly GDP figures as 
countries publish them; other international bodies, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (I.M.F) and World Bank, consider that the OECD method not 
only poses no particular problem but in fact has become the method of reference 
that is used, or should be used, by everyone; leading financial institutions, from 
Goldman Sachs to Deutsche Bank to JP Morgan, have all approved the OECD 
method and used it systematically. 
This method raises serious questions, however.  
First, we will remind the reader of how this method has been con-
structed and submit it to a critical examination. 
Second, we shall present our own AB method (as in Antoine Brunet), 
and describe how this method avoids the problems in the OECD approach. 
Third, we shall seek to show the consequences this has on the main cur-
rent economic debates.  
Fourth, we will conclude there are two different strategies towards GDP 
growth, the mercantilist one and the non-mercantilist one.  
 
 
1. The OECD method for calculating contributions to GDP growth 
 
This begins with identifying production and total demand over the course of two 
successive quarters: 
GDPn = TDDn + ETBn 
 
GDPn-1 = TDDn-1 + ETBn-1 
 
In which TDD is the Total Domestic Demand and ETB is the External Trade 
Balance. 
 
From there, the following is very naturally deduced: 
GDPn – GDPn-1 = (TDDn – TDDn-1) + (ETBn – ETBn-1) 
 
and: 
GDPn – GDPn-1 = (TDDn – TDDn-1) + (ETBn – ETBn-1) 
GDPn-1                    GDPn-1                      GDPn-1 
 
By assuming that GDPn often differs little from TDDn, they arrive at the follow-
ing formula:  
∆ GDP = ∆ TDD +  ∆ ETB 
GDPn-1     TDDn-1    GDPn-1            (OECD formula) A Pertinent Analytic Method to Correctly Measure Contributions to Growth in Gross Domestic Product 
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In sum, according to the OECD approach, the relative variation in GDP 
is therefore equal to the sum of the relative variation in Total Domestic Demand 
TDD and a special variable, which is the ratio between the change in the Exter-
nal Trade Balance and the initial GDP (GDPn-1). So far, so good. 
However, things go awry when the OECD method sets up some very ar-
bitrary terminology by designating this special variable as “the contribution from 
the External Trade Balance to the growth of GDP”.  This premise skews the re-
sult:  the OECD method imposes upon the user this definition of the special va-
riable. 
In our opinion, however, it is the ratio between the External Trade Bal-
ance and the initial GDP that correctly measures the contribution of the External 
Trade Balance to growth: 
  If a country exports more than it imports, this will introduce a posi-
tive added value which is equal to its external trade surplus 
  If a country imports more than it exports, this will introduce a nega-
tive added value which is equal to its external trade deficit.  
This is a generally accepting accounting practice worldwide. Hence 
there is no ground here to equivocate: it is indeed the ratio of the External Trade 
Balance to the initial GDP that correctly measures the contribution to GDP 
growth due to external demand. 
Let us immediately point out another major particularity of this “OECD 
relationship”: by construction, the variable ∆ETB/GDPn-1 represents a relatively 
insignificant value. From one country to another, the variation of the external 
balance as a percentage of initial GDP is very low as is shown by the charts be-
low.  In general, applying the OECD formula tends to result in the same diagno-
sis:  “the relative variation of GDP in country C over the course of quarter n is 
essentially explained by the relative variation of its domestic demand”.  
We could say we are looking at a barometer that constantly reads 
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Figure 1: Contribution to GDP growth. OECD method 
 
Source: AB Marchés. 
 
In any case, it is rare indeed that applying the OECD formula will allow 
us to designate an External Trade Surplus as a sustainable force driving the 
economy, or an External Trade Deficit as a sustainable roadblock to the evolu-
tion of GDP in a given country. Even countries that are widely known for suc-
cessfully practicing the mercantilist strategy of External Trade Surpluses – such 
as Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, etc. – are told under the OECD me-
thod that GDP growth is not reliant on their External Trade Surplus, but on the 
contrary rests solely on their domestic demand. 
Consequently, the OECD formula should be rejected by practitioners 
because it fails to take into account the appropriate mechanisms for calculating 
GDP growth and also fails to distinguish between countries according to the 
growth strategy that they have adopted. 
 
 
2. The AB method for calculating contributions to GDP growth 
 
First, we should clearly state that the AB approach is as mathematically sound as 
the OECD method. 
We identify production and domestic and net foreign demand.   
GDPn = TDDn + ETBn 
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We next subtract the initial level of GDP from both sides:  
(GDPn – GDPn-1) = (TDDn – GDPn-1) + ETBn 
 We then divide by GDPn-1 :  
 
GDPn – GDPn-1 = (TDDn – GDPn-1) + ETBn 
         GDPn-1                     GDPn-1          GDPn-1 
    
 
∆ GDP = TDDn – GDPn -1 +  ETBn 
GDPn-1         GDPn-1           GDPn-1 
  
 
This clearly shows that the relative variation of GDP is the exact sum of 
two major significant quantities, one quantity that we have just mentioned 
above, “the External Trade Balance in relation to the initial GDP”, and another 
special variable, (TDDn-GDPn-1)/GDPn-1. 
We propose to refer to this special variable as “the degree of modulation 
in domestic spending”. This variable is a quantity that can be negative or posi-
tive. If it is negative, one can speak of the degree of restriction on domestic 
spending. If it is positive, one can speak of the degree of stimulation in domestic 
spending. 
 
Figure 2: GDP growth contribution. AB method 
 
Source: AB Marchés. 
(AB formula) Antoine Brunet 
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2.1 The first case (the example of Japan and the Euro Zone in our charts) 
A country’s domestic spending during quarter n turns out to be sustainably low-
er than its GDP in quarter n-1. In truth, there is nothing surprising here.   
According to the adage, a country cannot live beyond its means; it can 
only spend what it has previously earned. A certain number of countries there-
fore oblige themselves not to spend more than was earned in the preceding quar-
ter.   
We could argue that these countries are only behaving “perfectly nor-
mally”. However, global macroeconomics presents us with a paradox:  if most 
big countries behaved this way all the time, i.e. “perfectly normally”, it wouldn’t 
take long for the global economy to go into depression. To enjoy sustainable 
growth, the global economy, as we might intuit, needs at least certain big coun-
tries to behave “abnormally”.  
Be that as it may, when this special variable (TDD-GDPn-1)/GDPn-1 is 
negative, it is both natural and legitimate to call it “the degree of restriction on 
domestic demand”. 
 
2.2 The second case (the example of the United States and the United King-
dom in our charts) 
A country’s total domestic spending from quarter to quarter does not turn out to 
be sustainably higher than its GDP in the previous quarter. This case is more 
surprising. How, then, can a country position itself sustainably in such a configu-
ration? For us, there are two conditions: 
 
2.2.1 Both the country and its citizens must show an appetite and a facility for 
indebtedness (domestic and/or foreign) 
If quarterly spending does turn out to be higher than GDP in quarter n-1, it is 
because the net amount of borrowing exceeds the amount of savings over the 
course of quarter n. Consequently, those domestic agents that are net borrowers 
(from domestic or foreign lenders) go more deeply into debt than the amount 
that gets saved by those among them that are net creditors.   
Historically, the element that made it easier for certain countries to sub-
scribe to this very peculiar configuration was the decoupling of bank funds from 
gold, which occurred in a two-step process.   
  1946: Bretton-Woods. The convertibility of national currencies into 
gold was definitively dropped for private individuals. The only ex-
ception: foreign central banks could present their dollars to the US 
Federal Reserve to convert them into gold at the fixed rate of $35 an 
ounce. A Pertinent Analytic Method to Correctly Measure Contributions to Growth in Gross Domestic Product 
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  1971: Nixon Decision. The above exception was suddenly and de-
finitively abolished. Dollars accumulated as assets by foreign central 
banks were no longer convertible into gold.   
Since 1946, and even more so after 1971, credit creation ex nihilo be-
came possible on a very grand scale. This allowed banks to lend massively and 
to massively solicit potential borrowers. This behavior became commonplace in 
the developed countries and took on a considerable magnitude, most particularly 
in the United States, which considered itself, doubtlessly wrongly so, safe from 
any problem of external financing.   
 
2.2.2 The country must be able repeatedly to withstand a trade deficit 
The available data show that those countries that spend more than they have 
earned expose themselves to repeated heavy trade deficits. A question then aris-
es with regard to how long these economies can  sustain that.   
Their ability to “stomach” successive trade deficits can either rest upon 
initially strong foreign exchange reserves, or on a strong international credit rat-
ing that allows them to take on major external indebtedness.   
The countries that take the risk of maintaining domestic spending that is 
chronically higher than GDP for the previous quarter, and that do not enjoy this 
ability to “stomach” repeated trade deficits, quite quickly find their external fi-
nances in a crisis position: e.g., Mexico (1995), South Korea, South-East Asia, 
Russia and South America (1997-2001) and some Eastern European countries 
(2008).    
Be as it may, when the special variable (TDD-GDPn-1)/GDPn-1 is posi-
tive, it is both legitimate and natural to define it as “the degree of stimulation in 
domestic spending”.   
Moreover, country by country, it can be verified that when monetary and 
budgetary policy becomes more stimulating, the degree of stimulation to domes-
tic spending (as we measure it) is strengthened (or in the alternative, the degree 
of restriction is reduced).  In the same manner, when stock and real estate mar-
kets are rising, borrowing behavior is strengthened and savings behavior is di-
minished, and that phenomenon very naturally leads to a reinforcement of the 
degree of stimulation of domestic spending (or, in the alternative, in a reduction 
of the degree of restriction on domestic spending).   
To conclude, let us return to the AB relationship.  It is stated thus:  for 
each country and for each quarter, the relative variation in GDP is the sum of the 
“degree of modulation of domestic spending” and the “ratio of the External 
Trade Balance” (ETB/GDPn-1). 
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2.3 To give an idea of the advantage of the AB method versus the OECD 
method, we shall put forward two examples 
The first example: while the OECD formula inevitably concludes that for every 
country and every quarter, it is the relative variation in domestic demand that 
explains the relative variation in GDP, our formula turns out to be highly dis-
criminating and presents the advantage of distinguishing between two kinds of 
countries:   
1.  Countries benefiting from a highly positive trade surplus and which, 
thanks to this, can afford a restriction of their domestic spending 
without its hindering the growth of their GDP. These include Japan 
and the whole of the Euro Zone (see our graphs). Most particularly, 
in the heart of the Euro Zone, we also find Germany, the Nether-
lands, Belgium and Finland. Switzerland and Sweden. In Asia, we 
find Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. The lack of quar-
terly figures does not allow us to make the calculation for China, but 
it would appear that China is among the leaders of this club. These 
countries have successfully adopted a mercantilist strategy; they 
have succeeded in basing their growth on recurrent trade surpluses. 
2.  Countries affected by a very negative trade deficit, and which none-
theless achieve GDP growth because they have significantly stimu-
lated their domestic spending. These include the United States, the 
United Kingdom (see our graphs). In the heart of the Euro Zone, 
Spain, Italy and France are in this category. These countries are non-
mercantilist; they have based their growth solely on stimulating their 
domestic spending and are resigned in advance to a trade deficit. 
The second example: our method (we successfully used it since the end 
of the 1970’s) very naturally makes clear the genesis and onset of the current 
crisis at the end of 2007.   
1.  The genesis of the crisis: The External Trade Balance of the United 
States, and to a lesser degree, that of the other G7 countries, began 
degrading as of the end of 2001. There is a common foreign factor 
contributing to this development: China’s entrance in the World 
Trade Organization, endowed with an outrageously advantageous 
fixed exchange rate. The United States, under the leadership of Fed 
Chairman Alan Greenspan, gave up opposing the shock of a grow-
ing trade deficit with China and decided instead to adapt to it.  How? 
By compensating for it by stimulating domestic spending every 
quarter. During 13 consecutive quarters, domestic spending was on 
average at 6,5% above the previous quarter’s GDP; that allowed the 
US to rise above its average trade deficit of 5.75% of the previous 
quarter’s GDP; in total, its GDP was to stabilize at a quarterly A Pertinent Analytic Method to Correctly Measure Contributions to Growth in Gross Domestic Product 
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+0.75% each quarter, at +3.0% on an annualized basis. However, to 
attain this result, it was of course necessary to massively encourage 
borrowing by American citizens and discourage their savings, there-
by dangerously mortgaging the American economy.   
2.  The onset of the crisis: In every country, there is a maximum limit, 
difficult to quantify a priori, to the degree of indebtedness that sol-
vent households can bear. When that limit was for all purposes 
reached, the American banks and para-banks ventured into subprime 
credit, that is to say credit for insolvent households. As we know, 
this was harbinger of the banking crisis in the summer of 2007. 
After the banking crisis had suddenly wiped out interbank confidence, 
the banks became paralyzed with fear and brutally interrupted all financing ac-
tivities. As for the households, worried by the successive crises in real estate, 
banking and the stock market, then by the consequent sudden rise in unemploy-
ment, they in turn brutally increased their rate of saving. It is not astonishing 
that, after the summer of 2007, as soon as the degree of stimulation in domestic 
spending in the USA had reached its extremes, it suddenly collapsed and fell 
from 6.5% to only 1% of GDP.  Simultaneously, external trade deficit remained 
largely intact and stable at around 2.5% of GDP (this is a confirmation that the 
deficit came principally from the massive under-valuation of the Yuan). Hence-
forth, early 2008 was ripe for the outbreak of an outright recession, the worst 
since World War II and one that unfortunately will have lasted much longer than 
expected. 
In the quarters to come, stimulating domestic spending will rely purely 
on borrowing by the Federal state. Meanwhile, China’s intransigence since July 
2008, notably by pegging the dollar again - at 6.83 Yuan to 1$ -, makes it nearly 
impossible to foresee any US return to a foreign trade surplus in the near future. 
Because of this, getting out of a declared recession will be problematic and me-
diocre at best.   
 
 
3. Return to the sources of GDP growth 
 
In the final analysis, the OECD method presents itself as “the simple, common 
sense method”, “the method that goes without saying”. What goes without say-
ing is that it is a formula that fails to take into consideration the complexities of 
the current economic situation.   
Our method, the AB method, tries on the contrary to record formally the 
findings of Knut Wicksell and John Maynard Keynes, which have clearly shown 
their superiority to those of Jean-Baptiste Say, as much on the level of ideas as 
on the level of facts. It is henceforth widely recognized that production does not Antoine Brunet 
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create demand, that it is demand that fuels production, and that it is therefore 
demand that limits production.  
We must therefore draw all the logical consequences from this conclu-
sion. If it is overall demand that limits the growth of production, then it is logical 
to concentrate our attention on the factors that are likely to stimulate overall de-
mand.  
Put simply, in an economy that would be both closed and deprived of 
any financial system, demand in quarter n would be equal at best to the GDP of 
quarter n-1, and the GDP of quarter n would therefore be equal at best to the 
GDP of quarter n-1; zero growth would be the best one could hope for. 
To escape from such perpetual economic stagnation, two levers (and on-
ly two) are now available to stimulate overall demand of a country and allow it 
to post a higher level of GDP than that of the previous quarter: 
  As soon as there is foreign trade, each country can capture demand 
elsewhere. How? By selling abroad in quarter n more than the coun-
try buys from its trading partners. When this happens, its best meas-
ure is what we called “the ratio of External Trade Surplus to the pre-
vious quarter’s GDP”. 
  As soon as there is a minimum of financial engineering, each coun-
try  can capture demand from the future. How? By immediately 
speeding up demand from its citizens, which otherwise would have 
taken longer. By what device can this be done? By encouraging its 
citizens to borrow overall more than they save, so that they buy dur-
ing quarter n more than they produced and earned during quarter (n-
1). When this happens, its best measure is what we called “the de-
gree of stimulation of domestic spending”. 
In a manner of speaking, when some households, some businesses and 
some municipalities or states borrow more than they save, they anticipate their 
future capacity to produce and purchase and, without knowing it, they contribute 
to the growth of GDP.   
 
 
4. Two distinct kinds of growth strategies coexist: The mercantilist and the 
non-mercantilist strategies 
 
What strikes the observer is the absence of rotation between countries with re-
gard to foreign trade. For decades, certain countries have made consistent for-
eign trade surpluses (Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, etc.) whereas other countries have fal-
len prey to consistent foreign trade deficits (the United States, of course, but also 
the United Kingdom, Australia, Spain, and to a lesser degree, Italy and France). 
And when a country like China decides after 1989 (Tiananmen) to make its mark A Pertinent Analytic Method to Correctly Measure Contributions to Growth in Gross Domestic Product 
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on the international level, it unhesitatingly takes the option of joining a particular 
side, in this case the club of countries with a consistent External Trade Surplus, 
as previously had Japan done.  
Obviously, as everyone can deduce, the situation of the former group of 
countries is much more comfortable than that of the latter countries.  In any case, 
this absence of rotation proves that certain countries, whatever the political 
stripe of their successive administrations might be, have definitively opted to 
maintain, most often successfully, repeated foreign trade surpluses, while other 
countries, whatever the political stripe of their successive administrations might 
be, have resigned themselves to repeated foreign deficits.    
Such consistency in firm choices calls for a very peculiar terminology:  
it seems natural to designate the former countries as mercantilist countries:  
these countries behave in effect in line with the traditional mercantilist authors 
who argued that success in economic politics derived from recurrent foreign 
trade surpluses. As for the others, for lack of a better word, we shall call them 
non-mercantilist countries.   
In reality, it is extremely rare that a country enjoys growth with both 
levers at the same time, that of foreign surpluses and that of domestic indebted-
ness greater than savings. Mercantilist countries generally do well with the first 
lever, but score in the negative for the second. Non-mercantilist countries, by 
contrast, do poorly with the first lever, but generally compensate with a positive 
score in the second. 
The growth equation thereby takes two distinct forms according to the 
type of country:   
For the mercantilist countries: will the net savings behavior of their citi-
zens stay limited enough in relation to the foreign trade surplus for overall quar-
terly demand to be really greater than the GDP of the previous quarter?   
For the non-mercantilist countries: will the net borrowing behavior of 
their citizens be strong enough in relation to the foreign trade deficit for the 
quarterly total demand to be really greater than the GDP of the previous quarter? 
One must keep in mind that on the global level, foreign trade is a zero 
sum game. Thus it is impossible that all countries can simultaneously succeed in 
their mercantilist strategies. In this context, it takes a strong strategic will among 
the leadership of mercantilist states to maintain sustainable success. In general, 
countries that successfully maintain mercantilist strategies over the years have 
enjoyed certain advantages to which none of their competitors have access (cus-
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Conclusion  
 
Either the OECD method or the AB method? The OECD method is a source of 
confusion and offers no interpretation. The AB method proves itself far more dis-
criminatory and pertinent. It leads to a more consistent and reliable interpretation.   
Along the way, it has been seen that the AB method, in a manner of 
speaking, permits us to quantify the updated message of the traditional mercantilist 
authors, William Petty and Friedrich List, in particular, who explained to their 
contemporaries that prosperity and power belonged to countries that settled com-
fortably into repeated foreign trade surpluses to the detriment of their partners.  
Everything indicates that tomorrow’s economic debates are going to turn 
around two axes: the prolongation of the global economic crisis due to the 
chronic insufficiency in global demand; the confrontation between China and the 
United States for world hegemony. 
When it comes to quantifying the observed trends that fuel these two 
major debates, we are convinced that the AB method will reveal itself to be 
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